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The culmination of the large-scale influx of migrants in the European area 
in 2015 and 2016 has not only led to severe pressure on the affected countries 
– transit countries as well as countries of destination –, but also to the questio-
ning of fundamental achievements of the European Union such as the freedom 
of movement. The migrant crisis also shed light on pressing issues still in need 
of satisfying responses reflecting reality, such as the case of the revision of the 1951 
Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and the Dublin III Regulation 
setting forth that an asylum application needs to be filed in the first coun-
try of entry. Not only did the crisis reveal already existing ruptures between 
Western and Eastern Europe, but it also showed that the European Union 
as such is incapable of taking firm and swift decisions regarding the protection 
of its own borders and citizens against an unprecedented influx of irregular 
migrants – many of them without official documents.
The migrants crisis also led to a paradigmatic shift associated mainly 
with the significance of political territoriality in the European political space. 
This shift was primarily a result of the clash between the V4 countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the European “core” regarding 
what the correct solutions for the migration crisis are. For the V4 countries 
the problem of integration deficit among several groups of immigrants in We-
stern Europe and the societal, economic and security challenges and consequ-
ences thereof has also functioned as a warning signal against large-scale irregu-
lar migration from countries, significantly differing from the Judeo-Christian 
European societies in terms of culture, religion and demography. According 
to official data from European Asylum Support Office (EASO) more than 
1,2 million asylum applications were lodged during 2016, which is purely 
a 9% decrease compared to the record year of 2015, when around 1,4 million 
persons applied for asylum in the EU+ countries (including Norway and Swit-
zerland).1 The minor decrease is merely a symbolic development regarding all 
the efforts taken during 2016 to stem the continuing flow of irregular migrants 
towards a European Union (eg. enhanced border controls, the EU-Turkey 
agreement, strengthening of Frontex). 
1 EASO, “Latest Asylum Trends – 2016 Overview”, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017],
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A survey carried out by the Spring 2015 Standard Eurobarometer has also 
demonstrated the negative potential of the lack of efficient border manage-
ment related to the illegal migration: “…citizens see immigration as the major 
challenge facing the EU currently.”2 These findings came well before the actual 
culmination of the migration crisis. The gradual increase in migration and 
the deepening of the crisis further exacerbated the disagreements between the 
V4 countries (which placed great emphasis on the security approach, i.e. threat 
to public order and security, the welfare state as well as the identity of the host 
society) and the European “core” (especially Germany and the European Com-
mission, which placed emphasis on the positivist humanitarian approach). 
The traditional Western European host countries tended to initially disregard 
from the V4 approach and have clearly considered the opinion of the V4 as ir-
relevant to EU decision making. This approach resulted in a serious underesti-
mation of the driving forces emerging from the sense of external threat leading 
to an attempt, or aiming at stopping contact with an undesirable or dange-
rous neighbor.3 In this case aiming at intersection of the post-modern world 
(or Barnett’s Functioning Core) with the pre-modern world (or Barnett’s Non-
Integrating Gap) where non-state threats are coming from. Theoretically it has 
been a conflict between the realistic paradigm with the liberal one according to 
which: “the primary function of state borders is to ensure contacts between the 
neighboring countries and facilitate their interaction.”4
The dynamics of illegal migration in 2015 questions the very concept and 
practice of the 1951 Refugee Convention which lies at the core of the EU’s 
neo-liberal immigration and asylum policy. The related loss of control over ter-
ritorial jurisdiction (effective border management), borders and both internal 
and external security created a condition of chaos under which authorities were 
unable to responsibly evaluate which individuals are fleeing from conflict zo-
nes and thus qualifying for the refugee status and which are cases of economic 
migrants seeking economic privileges.
Despite the fact that asylum law is a national competence of the Member 
States of the European Union, several Member States felt the aching lack of re-
sponses to efficiently protect the external borders of the Union. Hence, several 
2 “Eurobarometr Spring 2015 Standard Eurobarometer: Citizens See Immigration as Top Challenge 
for EU to Tackle. Europe Should See Refugees as a Boon, Not a Burden”, 18 September 2015, The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/opinion/europe-should-see-refugees-as-a-boon-not-a-
burden.html?_r=0 [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
3 V. Kolossov, “Theoretical Approaches in the Study of Border”, [in:] Introduction to Border Studies, 
eds S.V. Sevastianov, J.P. Liane, A.A. Kireev, Vladivostok 2015, p. 45.
4 Ibidem, p. 39.
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countries – such as Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria at a later stage 
– felt forced to unilaterally adopt own security measures to protect their 
territory and citizens. This is also the case of the V4 countries, who do not 
question the purpose and true intent of the 1951 Geneva Convention, but who 
refuse to provide any form of protection to irregular migrants claiming to have 
the right to freely choose the country of final destination (so called “asylum- 
shopping”) and who do not respecting the sancticity of state borders, nor the 
laws of the country they are in. This has been in a sharp contrast with the pseu-
do-humanitarian approach ignoring a state’s responsibility to control and pro-
tect borders, to provide a public order and security but also to provide its citi-
zens with a basic facts on the background of the persons entering the country. 
Even F. Crépeau (Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
UNHCR) when urging “Europe” to open its borders because it was claimed 
to be a moral imperative to save lives,5 ignored basic facts that this would pro-
bably only function as a tacit invitation to more people to reach the EU. Still 
the EU is stuck in a moral dilemma and is unable to acknowledge the fact that 
many of these migrants end up in less pleasant situations due to their own 
behaviour. This concerns both the those entitled to refugee protection as well 
as the economic migrants. The inability of the EU put a working plan on 
the table to cope with the migrant crisis reflects the large gap between policy 
and reality, as the introduction of the borderless EU (removal of internal bor-
ders) still does not walk hand in hand with a proper border management 
of external Schengen borders.
This political clash reached its climax at the beginning of 2016, when the 
V4 summit in Prague (15 February 2016) united the V4 countries around 
the criticism of the German immigration strategy and called for an alternative 
back-up plan to stop the migrants at the borders of Greece. The EU thus be-
came engulfed in a double clash of ideas – on one hand, there was the issue 
of how to react to the “eastern threat”; on the other, an adequate reaction to 
the southern threat had to be found. This clash clearly showed the limits of the 
supra-national solution, while at the same time enabling reflections on the more 
complex processes taking place on global level – the very processes, which the 
post-modern EU long refused to consider. In fact, we are dealing with a fun-
damental paradigmatic shift stemming from the dichotomic nature of globali-
zation. As S. Gradanos, Z. Murphy, K. Schaul and A. Faiola have recently no-
5 G. Jackson, “UN’s François Crépeau on the Refugee Cisis: Instead of Resisting Migration, Let’s 
Organise It”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/22/uns-francois-crepeau-on-the-refugee-cri 
sis-instead-of-resisting-migration-lets-organise-it [accessed: 12.02.2017].
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ted in The Washington Post: “A generation ago, globalization shrank the world. 
Nations linked by trade and technology began to erase old boundaries. But 
now barriers are rising again, driven by waves of migration, spillover from wars 
and the growing threat of terrorism.“6 The authors, in their duly named article 
“A New Age of Walls”, identified and empirically researched a trend, which 
could be labelled border hardening, re-bordering (other fitting terminology 
could also be used), and which is becoming a more and more apparent element 
of the political process. 
Root Causes of Migration towards Europe
As it has been held many times previously: migration is as old as man-
kind itself. The notion of migration covers all types of migratory movements: 
intra-state, international, voluntary or forced, regular and irregular. The causes 
of the present-day migration are complex and multicausal, as pointed by 
Robert Zetter. Zetter indentifies the following drivers (or push factors) of mi-
gration, which interact with and reinforce each other: 1) intrastate conflicts, 
existence of violent non-state territorial actors such as Da’esh (VNSTA), 
2) poor-governance, political instability, and repression, 3) environmental fac-
tors.7 What is impotants is that demographic pressure may also be added to the 
list. Intrastate conflicts lies at the core of migration from countries like Syria, 
Iraq or Libya, poor governance and political oppression in the case of Eritrea 
for instance, and environmental factors might explain driving forces behind the 
migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa. Although Somalia 
is currently not ranking among the top source countries of migration towards, 
it offers an empirical example of the country struck by all above mentioned fac-
tors: political instability since the end of 1980s, political oppression by various 
and competing VNSTA, environmental factors (resulting in famine and dro-
ught), the violent action of the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab and ongoing 
intrastate conflicts and etc. The last factor reflects broader geopolitical chan-
ges in the EU’s proximity (Libya, Syria). The year 2014 witnessed the highest 
number of conflicts reported since 1999, growing number of internationalized 
armed conflicts, the highest yearly death toll in the post-Cold War period.8
Pull factors might be coined as the other side of the coin including 1) se-
cure environment, 2) liberal political system guaranteeing political rights and 
civic liberties, 3) economically developed including benefits of welfare states, 
6 T. Benner, “Europe’s Lonely Liberal Hegemon”, Politico, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/
merkel-shock-refugee-crisis-germany-policy-europe/ [accessed: 21.01.2017].
7 R. Zetter, Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era, Migration Police 
Institute, Transatlantic Council of Migration 2015, p. 6.
8 T. Pettersson, P. Wallensteen, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2014”, Journal of Peace Research 2015.
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4) open migration policies. For Oxford economics professor Paul Collier things 
are crystal clear: “Angela Merkel is responsible for the refugee crisis. Who else?”9 
Although Angela Merkel might be attributed an authorship of Germany’s open 
doors policy, it can not itself explain all the underlying causes of the migrant 
crisis of 2015 which only has increased afterwards. Standard of living in the 
EU is an important pull factors for economic migrants coming from the global 
south. As F. Crépeau admits: “[t]hese people (economic migrants) know the-
re are jobs… Migrants are not stupid, they would not go to places where there 
are no jobs.”10 However this assumption contradicts not only the unemploy-
ment rate in many EU Member States but also official data on the employment 
rate among migrants and refugees. “The survey of refugees’ employment status, 
educational background and values was conducted by the research department 
of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the IAB and DIW rese-
arch institutes. It shows that of the refugees who arrived last year and in January 
2016, 13 percent are in work.”11 This reflects a sharp contrast with a situation 
in 1950’s when the major Western European economies were recovering from 
the aftermaths of the Second World War and needed (cheap) workforce.
Migration and the Process of Re-bordering in the European Area
 Re-bordering is by far not a new phenomenon, but it was the migration 
wave of 2015 which brought to the EU: “[p]aradigmatic shifts: from drawing 
an optimistic perspective of a borderless world (or the ‘Europeanisation’ of na-
tional borders) to a focus on re-bordering, fencing and increasing securitiza-
tion…”12 V. Kolossov and J. Scott have pointed out already in 2013 “the rena-
issance of border studies”13, which in reality represents “counter-narratives to 
globalization discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For a rather short 
but influential period, prophesies of ‘borderless worlds’ abounded in which 
global technologies, cyberspace, capital flows, East-West political convergence 
and interstate integration would make political borders obsolete.”14
This “backlash” with regard to the emphasis placed on political territoriality 
cannot be considered just as a reflection of the common cliché concerning the 
generally ever-worsening security environment. On the contrary, it should be 
9 T. Benner, op. cit.
10 G. Jackson, op. cit.
11 M. Martin, “Only 13 Percent of Recent Refugees in Germany Have Found Work: Survey”, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-survey-idUSKBN13A22F [accessed: 12.01.2017].
12 V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 30.
13 Ibidem, p. 36.
14 Ibidem, p. 50.
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considered a belated reaction or the result of a lack of timely strategic analysis 
reflecting in an objective manner the various processes taking place in the geo-
graphic neighbourhood of Europe. Whether we deal with the ever-more asser-
tive behaviour of the actors living in Cooper’s modern world (something that 
the EU could witness first hand already in 2008 during the conflict in Geor-
gia), or the geopolitical situation and threats associated with it (civil wars, hu-
man trafficking, illegal migration, international terrorism, acts of violent non-
state actors) in many pre-modern world states, these issues have not appeared 
out of the blue in 2015. Rather, the EU has simply reacted belatedly to a pre-
vailing global trend, which has left the discourse about the “‘borderless world’ 
where walls and fences would become increasingly anachronistic”15 and is he-
ading towards a completely opposite process, where we can clearly witness “the 
global trend toward hardened borders... by the massive development of barriers 
on international borders.”16
The reinvented emphasis on the political significance of borders – “a process 
of re-bordering on a global scale has already been taking place after 9/1117 – is 
thus a practical and specific reaction to different types of geopolitical threats 
originating from qualitatively and geographically different worlds – from the 
pre-modern (southern) and modern (eastern) worlds. The threats are also dif-
ferent with regards to their nature. However, the reaction on the supra-natio-
nal and national level is, perhaps surprisingly, very much similar, and it consists 
of re-discovering the “traditional understanding of borders as markers of sove-
reignty.”18 As Kolossov and Scott further point out, the “relationships between 
borders and national sovereignty remain important to research debate as these 
are at the heart of contemporary geopolitical orders.”19
The ongoing crises in the European area have again initiated the debate 
about the erosion of a sovereign state, which was especially intensive in the 
academia at the very end of the 20th century. At this time, there was “the idea 
that political boundaries are being eroded by crises of state sovereignty and 
the new forms of ‘globalized political authority’ and the networked nature of the 
world system indicate a relative shift of political power away from the State.”20 
The group of authors emphasizing the centrifugal impact on state sovereignty 
mainly stressed the economic aspect of globalization while overlooking the 
15 S. Rosiére, R. Jones, “Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation through the Role of Walls and 
Fences”, Geopolitics, 2012, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 217.
16 Ibidem, p. 220.
17 V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 50.
18 Ibidem.
19 Ibidem.
20 Ibidem.
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political and security dimension. Consequently they wrongly assessed the im-
pact of internationalization of economic life the diminishing role of states’s 
borders and their role as noted by V. Kolossov.21 
Especially the latter of these, however, has been coming to the fore since the 
9/11 attacks. It was this shift in priorities which was manifested in the signi-
ficance of borders: “…open and more flexible borders are vital for economic 
reasons, while tighter and more closed borders are seen as important security 
measures.”22 É. Vallet a C.-P. David note that the “9/11 marked a watershed 
in international relations. One of the results has been the growing fortification 
of borders... September 11 sparked not only a quantitative surge in wall-buil-
ding but also a qualitative break.”23
M. Carr has already in 2012 referred to this ongoing dichotomic process, 
which is especially closely tied with the phenomenon of migration: “This dual 
process of softening/hardening borders has been particularly striking in the Eu-
ropean Union” (CARR referred 2012). At the same time, Carr also pointed out 
various factors, which are still the object of an expert and political discussion 
on the international level, leading to a renewed emphasis on the political ter-
ritoriality and the political importance of borders. In the 1990s, “borders were 
studies as a laboratory of globalisation and mostly considered as a remainder 
of an old territoriality.”24
D.B. Carter and P. Poast, for example, by using political-economic theory, 
reject the claim that this process is a reaction to the migration wave, and they 
state: “However, we do not find any support for the idea that a higher number 
of refugees flows are associated with building walls.”25 Processes taking place 
in the political space, especially the construction of border fences – D.B. Carter 
and P. Poast talking about “...the most aggressive strategies being the construc-
tion of physical barriers...”26 – yet have a clearly traceable linkage to the migra-
tion crisis. “The new political prioritisation of borders has been shaped by va-
rious factors, from economic insecurity and anxieties about national identity to 
law enforcement and security concerns. But the overriding priority behind the 
new border regimes, from the Rio Grande and the Sinai to the Greek-Turkish 
border, is the prevention of ‘illegal migration’ – a category that generally refers 
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem.
23 D.B. Carter, P. Poast, “Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border 
Stability”, Journal of Conflict Research, 2015, published online before print September 2015.
24 E. Vallet, C.-P. David, “Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations”, 
Journal of Borderland Studies, 2012, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 111–119.
25 D.B. Carter, P. Poast, op. cit.
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to undocumented migrants from the global south, whether defined as‚ econo-
mic migrants or refugees and asylum seekers.” The developments inside the 
Schengen Area and on the external borders (e.g. to keep non-OCED illegal mi-
grants out of the Spanish exclaves in Morocco) have testified to this well before 
the developments of 2015. J.B. Cannon also argues that one of the reasons that 
states erect border fences “is to keep undesirable elements such as migrants or 
terrorists out of their territory,”27 and he lists specific examples that would fall 
into this category: “Completed in 2014, the three-metre high border wall sepa-
rating Bulgaria and the European Union (EU) from Turkey is an extension of 
the border wall built between Greece and Turkey and completed in 2012. Bul-
garia built the wall in response to refugees moving north from Greece and cros-
sing into Bulgaria, and by extension the EU, after Greece erected its wall.”28
EU in the New Era of Globalisation
The above-mentioned process, which has been since the 2010s also taking 
place in Europe, was labelled by S. Ballif and S. Rosiére in 2019 as teichopo-
litics. S. Rosiére and R. Jones then further argue that in the teichopolitics era: 
“…(the politics of building barriers on borders for various security purposes)... 
the purpose of borders has shifted again to become a sire where privilege is pro-
tected and undesirable movements are prevented. Indeed, most of the new bor-
der barriers are erected to fight against illegal migrations, even if this dimension 
is often mixed with other concerns such as terrorism and security, it is primari-
ly linked with controlling migrations.”29 They also mention explicitly the “next 
era of globalisation... characterized by a coercive turn towards hard power”,30 
with the emphasis shifting steadily towards security issues. 
Both the migration crisis and the crisis in Ukraine have, somewhat para- 
doxically, proven that the basic element of even the most advanced integration 
project – the EU – remain the sovereign states, which are now rediscovering 
the meaning of political territoriality. The crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated 
the limits of the EU to adapt to the current trend of turning towards hard 
power. This had a clearly measurable impact in Estonia, which reacted to the 
Russian behaviour by erecting a border fence in an attempt to clearly mark 
its state borders. In the case of Ukraine, the same process or trend led even to 
the revisiting of the original military function of the border, with the borders 
27 B.J. Cannon, “Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia”, Journal 
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28 Ibidem.
29 S. Rosiére, R. Jones, op. cit., p. 221.
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de facto being raised inside the state territory. On the other hand, the migra-
tion crisis has then shown the limits of liberal paradigm and inability to enforce 
an effective border management on the supra-national level, when the EU had 
encountered e.g. the resistance from Greece to deploy military forces from 
other countries on its territory or when it had been forced to cooperate with 
NATO, a military alliance. In Europe, the uncontrolled migration wave has 
accelerated the securitarian discourse through 2015. The existence of this di-
scourse in other parts of the world, on the other hand, can be empirically 
proven already in the previous decades. “Securitization discourses have been 
accompanied by the construction of physical barriers to movement of people 
and goods which can take a form of concrete walls, barbed wires, virtual fence 
or even mined fields.”31
The EU is now entering a new era characterized by unilateral and aggressive 
border management. S. Rosiére and R. Jones32 call this era the next era of glo-
balisation, in which priority is given to security and attempts are made to phy-
sically separate the privileged and unprivileged worlds. At the same time, the 
awareness of how people in the privileged world live increases in the unprivi-
leged world. The teichopolitics phenomenon can thus be seen also as the most 
visible aspect of “a confrontation between geopolitical black holes and bright 
spots.”33 S. Gradanos et al point out that: “In 2015, work started on more new 
barriers around the world than at any other point in modern history. There 
are now 63 borders where walls or fences separate neighbouring countries.”34 
This trend has already picked up pace in the previous decades. D.B. Carter 
a D. Poast conclude “that over 50% of border walls built in the last two centu-
ries were built in the post-Cold War era.”35 It is essential here to consider both 
the quantitative and the qualitative factors. “A quantitative analysis suggests 
that walls are, indeed, a global phenomenon that merits further attention... 
Between 1945 and 1991, 19 walls and barriers were built..., between 1991 
and 2001, only 7 walls were added to the 13 that survived the Cold War... 
As of 2012, there were nearly 45 border walls (soon to be 48) totalling more 
than 29,000 km2.”36 Analysis in The Washington Post has shown that more than 
dozen other walls were constructed in the following four years. 
31 V. Kolossov, op. cit.
32 S. Rosiére, R. Jones, op. cit.
33 M. Naim, “Broken Borders, International Smuggling”, Newsweek, 2005, pp. 56–52.
34 S. Granados, Z. Murphy, K. Schaul, A. Faiola, “A New Age of Walls. Episode 1”, The Washington 
Post, 2016, No. 121.
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The paradigmatic shift concerning the issue of re-bordering was initially re-
jected by the European institutions, because it has been standing in a sharp 
contrast with the dominant discourse about borderless Europe and with the 
humanitarian approach towards migration. “First, even as those across a wide 
political spectrum neoliberals, cosmopolitans, humanitarians, and left activists 
fantasize a world without borders (whether consequent to global entrepreneur-
ship, global markets, global citizenship, or global governance), nation-states, 
rich and poor, exhibit a passion for wall building.”37 Disintegration potential 
of the migration crisis was reflecting the ongoing conflict between the liberal pa-
radigm preferred by the European institutions and EU’s member states’ societies 
showing as observed already in 2010 by Brown: „The striking popular desire for 
walling38 and resulting from ‘The sense of external threat gives rise to a desire to 
minimize or stop contact with an undesirable or dangerous neighbor.39”
G. Friedman has pointed out the transformation of the paradigm and has 
argued that the Europe of today is a continent of borders. It is the national bor-
ders that are at the centre of the main crises engulfing Europe at the moment 
– especially the crisis in Ukraine and the migration crisis.40 The role of borders 
became the focal point of the clash between the V4 countries and the Europe-
an institutions, which were, according to G. Friedman, on the hand unable to 
provide protection for the Schengen Area and, on the other, to ensure that “the 
borders could lose their significance.”41 In fact, the issue at stake here was re-
lated to a wider discussion about the meaning and significance of the national 
state, where “...the Union lacked the power to abolish the nation-state – it was 
too fundamental to the Europeans’ sense of identity... The idea of borders be-
ing archaic is meaningful only if the nation-state is archaic. There is no eviden-
ce that this is true in Europe... The European crisis, taken as a whole, is rooted 
in borders.”42 The EU has been experiencing a radical geopolitical turn-around 
from the questioning of the importance of the geographic factor in geopolitics 
in the golden era of globalization with the emphasis on “a new international 
landscape ushered in an era of globalization in which states appeared irrevoca-
bly condemned to obsolence, a world without borders... in which the state was 
relegated to secondary importance in international relations, coupled with the 
disappearance of physical borders.”43 The pressure stemming from the crisis of 
37 W. Brown, Walled States. Waning Sovereignty, New York 2015.
38 Ibidem.
39 V. Kolossov, op. cit.
40 G. Friedman, “What Borders Mean to Europe”, Geopolitical Weekly, 23 June 2015.
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borders forces the EU to accept that it is no longer possible to perceive the out-
side environment through its own moral imperative; it is this pressure exerted 
by the external environment which forces it to accept the function of “the se-
curity barriers that shield rich economies from the rest of the world have been 
described as a great wall of globalization”44 and the need to react to the poli-
tical, economic and societal incompatibility between the individual worlds as 
defined by R. Cooper, or to the dichotomic division of the world between the 
Functioning Core a Non-Integrating Gap according to T. Barnett. Migration 
crisis indirectly steers European states towards realization that: “The discour-
se about a borderless world concerns only ‘integrated’, open borders, mainly 
in Europe and North America. They constitute no more than 5% of state land 
borders.”45 Thus it’s necessary to apply the same logic to critical analysis of the 
post-modern paradigm, which continues to criticize: “barier functions, are not 
only ineffective, but harmful to the economy and society.”46 On the contrary 
it´s is inevitable to understand that effective fight against non-state threats re-
quires effective border managament, enforcing the existing rules (visa regime, 
entry conditions, etc.), but this is far remote to the complete closure or isola-
tion as post-modernist assert. The border-hardening process within the EU is 
a late reaction to the changing international environment, including the rising 
intersection of the state failure process and other non-state threats as noted by 
W. Brown: „These walls target nonstate transnational actors – individuals, gro-
ups, movements, organizations, and industries. They react to transnational, ra-
ther than internalional relations and respond to persistent, but often informal 
or subterranean powers, rather than to military undertakings… barriers that 
divide richer from poorer parts of the globe. This landscape signifies the ungo-
vernability by law and politics of many powers unleashed by globalization and 
late modern colonialization.”47 The general trend of rebordering and securi-
tization in Europe is especially visible when discussing the the clash between 
the V4 countries and the European institutions, concerning different visions 
of handling the phenomenon of current migration crisis.
Migration Crisis
Migration crisis which struck Europe in recent years is of great importance 
for the European Union as a whole, but to the V4 region as well. Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are all sceptical towards the idea of po-
44 Ibidem.
45 V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 43.
46 Ibidem, p. 49.
47 W. Brown, op. cit.
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sitivist humanitarian approach towards migrations and introducing limits on 
accepting refugees for each EU state. Such reluctance derives from many dif-
ferent aspects, from political and geopolitical to social and cultural. What is 
more, dynamically changing international situation and recognition of new se-
curity threats additionally result in desire for increasing safety measures. Even 
Germany and Sweden, which were the most open countries in response to the 
growing refugee crisis are changing their internal policies. The migration crisis 
together with repeating terrorist attacks in Europe sparked a debate on migra-
tion, migration and integration policy and distribution of resonsibility for re-
fugees among European states.
Populations of V4 countries are one of the most homogenous ethnically 
in European Union and the percentage of immigrants and native-born offspring 
of immigrants is below 10%. In Czech Republic it was around 8% in 2013, 
in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia less than 5%. According to Eurostat, only 1% 
of Polish population has been born abroad. Until now, all V4 states has been 
clasified as countries with immigrant population shaped by border changes or 
by national minorities. It means that until recent migration crisis, those states 
has not faced more critical or grave threats resulting from ethnic diversity. Such 
low proportion of immigrant populations results in lower tolerance towards 
foreigners and any signs of distinctiveness. Tolerance of ethnic minorities is 
in general decline in Europe since 2007. In the period of 2007 and 2012 in Po-
land the positive attitude declined by 10%, in Czech Republic more than 5%, 
Slovakia by 5% and Hungary by approximately 4%.
The migration crisis can result in change in those proportions, influencing 
the V4 states in terms of their internal stability and security. It also highli-
ghts the lack of efficient mechanisms of dealilng with such intensive migration 
flows, both in the field of migration, asylum and integration policies.
V4 and Migration Crisis – Factors Determining the Attitude 
towards Migration
The effectiveness of Visegrad Group is based on selection of common go-
als and aims. Owing to this, they can more efficiently advocate their national 
and regional interests.48 It is evident in case of migration crisis, which is cause 
of many concerns in V4 region. All the V4 states’ governments voice their 
anxiety, additionally deepened by latest terrorist attacks (Charlie Hebdo attack, 
Paris attacks, Niece attacks, Brussels attacks). What is more, such closeness 
of common goals and interests has been elaborated in spite of many historical 
48 T. Strážay, “Neither Beautiful nor Ugly, but Functional: A Pragmatic View on the Visegrad Group”, 
Contemporary European Studies, 2014, 2.
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48 T. Strážay, “Neither Beautiful nor Ugly, but Functional: A Pragmatic View on the Visegrad Group”, 
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territorial disputes.49 However, cultural closeness of those states, considered as 
Slavian (except Hungary) made a cooperation possible, at least to some extent. 
What is more, common past as a client states of USSR, then transition proces and 
at last, the EU accession proces made natural circumstances for cooperation. 
The aspect of common past deserves more attention as the shared heritage 
of over 40 years of communist rule left an imprint on all V4 states. Their go-
vernments constructed restrictive migration policies which made their boun-
daries almost airtight.50 This is one of the reasons, why populations of Czech 
Republik, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are that homogenous, with mostly 
national minorities of historical origin. Migration patterns initiated at the end 
of World War II, which encompassed returns of prisoners and fugitives of war 
and involuntary population movements. It meant, that in case of Poland, most 
of German population has been forced to leave the country. The emergence 
of Cold War interrupted all those prcesses and the communist rule concen-
trated its efforts on safeguarding the homogeneousness of the populations in 
the Soviet Block.51 Inclusion of V4 states into the area of Soviet control and 
influence also resulted in introducing and implanting in the societies certain 
patterns of behaviour, like fear of unknown, hesitancy towards foreign people, 
feeling of distinctiveness from the rest of Western European countries and so-
cieties. What is more, communist rule contributed to poor economic condition 
and the need to make an extreme effort of meeting Western standards. 
The economy condition of V4 states has a significant meaning. Owing to 
their communist past and late integration with Western Europe and its or-
ganisational structures, post-soviet states have to chase after more prosperous 
Western countries until present times. Both political and market transforma-
tion were a burden, resulting in many difficulties, inter alia high unemploy-
ment rate. This is one of the reasons for reluctance towards foreign labour force. 
In 2012 quarter of host-countries population in Europe considered immi-
gration as having negative impact on economy. Mostly Southern and Cen-
tral European countries’ populations views were most negative. Polish po-
pulation until now seemed to be the most favorable of all V4 states in case 
of economic impact of immigration – only 18% of population perceived immi-
gration to have bad impact on economy, while in Hungary 44%. In the survey 
from 2015, conducted by IPSOS for International Organisation for Migration 
situation changed and 40% of Polish respondents stated that they thought the 
49 A. Piskozub, A.-R. Kozłowski, “A Distant Mirror: Poland between the Visegrad Group and the 
Eastern Alliance”, Politické Vedy, 1 April 2016.
50 European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications, ed. M. Okólski, Amsterdam 2012.
51 Ibidem.
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migrants impact on labour market was negative, while 29% claimed it was po-
sitive . In the same survey conducted one year later, the outcomes were even less 
positive – 45% of respondents evaluated the migrants impact as negative while 
only 25% stated it was positive. It is then evident, that migration crises has ra-
dicalised the attitudes of Poles. What is more, in Poland only 48.9% perceived 
their area as a good place for migrants to settle in comaprison to Czech Repu-
blic where 58.7% found their city as good for migrants from other countries 
to live in. Another aspect of hesitancy among V4 states towards migrants in re-
gard to economy is the unemployent rate within foreign born. The unemploy-
ment rate among foreign-born population in V4 states is not blatantly high 
– in 2012 it was 8.6% in Czech Republic, 9.47% in Hungary, 9.84% in Poland 
and in Slovak Republic 11.11%. The total percentage for EU was 15.85%.
Threats to V4 Region
Does V4 region is in fact threatened by migration crisis? It is evident, that 
Hungary being the transit state can face significant threats. However, none 
of those states have the status of settlement countries or logstanding destina-
tions. The most popular states among refugees until recently has been Germany 
and Sweden, owing to their prosperous economies, good social care, the range 
of state’s welfare support and relatively high rate of tolerance towards migrants 
and ethnic diversification. 
In 2015 nearly 1,300,000 asylum applications in EU member states have 
been registered. In Hungary for example the number of immigrants grew from 
22,600 in 2007 to 26,000 in 2014, which is a 15% growth. In Poland it is 
40,600 to 60,000 respectively (48% growth). On the other hand, in Slovakia 
and Czech Republic the number of immigrants decreased. Growing numbers 
of asylum seekers, since vast of them come from Syrian Arab Republic (47% 
of all sea arrivals to Greece in 2016 and 28% of all sea arrivals in 2016), Afgha-
nistan (25%), Iraq (15%), Pakistan (5%), Iran (3%) and only 5% from other 
states are equal with even more growing ethnical diversity in Europe. 
However, refugees reaching especially Poland do not come from a culturally 
distant states. Traditionally, the highest number of refugees come from Russia 
– 86% with Chechen nationality. Since the escalation of the conflict in Ukra-
ine, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of Ukrainians 
seeking protection in Poland as well.52 Syrians who are the most numerous 
group of refugees reaching Europe seem to be less interested in V4 states as their 
destination. According to data from Eurostat, only 16% of asylum seekers 
52 J. Segeš-Frelak, “Poland as a Country of Migrants?”, New Eastern Europe, 1 November 2015.
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in 2014 in Poland were granted protection, whereas the EU average is 40%.53 
It is evidence for more restrictive migration and asylum policy in Poland. 
In 2015 Poland received only 285 asylum applications from Syria, Czech Repu-
blik 130, in Slovakia no applications from Syria were registered but 170 from 
Afghanistan. The worst situation is in Hungary, where 64,080 applications 
from Syrian citizens were registered. It should then be no surprise, that Hunga-
rian attitude is the most negative towards migration crisis and migrants them-
selves. However, owing to strict internal policy towards refugees, the number 
of asylum applications in Hungary dropped from 30,500 in September 2015 
to less than 1,000 at the end of 2015. 
It is important to note, that late transformation and former communist rule 
left V4 states with nearly no migration or integration policies. Accession to EU 
meant the necessity of gradual adjustments of migration plicies (especially visa 
and asylum regulations). However, the integration policies stayed neglected, 
mostly due to already mentioned low percentage of foreign-born population 
within receiving societies of V4 states. Another aspect of the problem is the 
temporary character of migrations, mostly aimed at seasonal wrok. This is 
the main legal gap that should be completed by V4 states’ governments in the 
light of ongoing migration crisis and introduced EU’s refugee quotas. What 
is more, the problem of illegal immigration and undeclared workforce of foreign 
origin should be solved as well. This is the problem that has its roots in the com-
munist rule in the V4 states, which introduced wide tolerance of informal busi-
ness practices. Both legal problems should be solved, as full isolation from im-
migration is rather impossible. Most of the European countries face the problem 
of ageing societies – fertility levels are decreasing and life expectancy is growing. 
In such conditions, most of the economic research and reports underline the 
importance of labour migration. Both mechanisms of integrating foreigners 
and counteracting illegal migration will allow better protection of each state’s 
security, stability and interests, as well as the whole V4 region. 
The Quota Compromise and V4’s Response 
The intensyfied inflow of refugees to Europe, mostly Greece, Italy and Hun-
gary, resulted in proposal of temporary derogation from the Dublin Regula-
tion, determining responsibility for the examination of asylum applications. 
Such high number of applications could result in the standstil of the asylum 
system. Therefore, relocation of refugees from the most burdened states has 
been planned, together with establishing the so-called hot spots fascilitating 
early identification of those in need of protection. The EU’s agreement reached 
53 Ibidem.
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in September 2015 meant relocation of 160,000 of refugees in total. However, 
the appointed quotas brought many doubts and concerns, especially within V4 
region and the whole proces of relocation is undergoing slowely. Until May 2016 
only 1,500 refugees from Italy and Greece has been relocated. The migration 
crisis cause a vivid reaction within V4 area, which is most sceptical towards 
welcoming refugees mostly from Syria. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia are mostly concerned about their internal security and stability. Since the 
V4 states seem to be less tolerant and open towards migration and cultural diversi-
ty, according to most of OECD data, political leaders of those states are trying to 
seek for alternative ways of facing the challenges deriving from migration crisis. 
Those alternative methods are mostly connected with strenghtening the 
borders. The V4’s proposal from February 2016 affects Macedonia and Bulga-
ria and it should lead to better control over Western Balkans migration route 
(Visegrad 4 Call for EU “Back-up Plan” to Block Migrants). Any ideas concer-
ning sealing borders in the South of Europe are not receiving a warm welcome 
in therest of EU’s member states due to main assault of leading to exclusion 
of Greece from Schengen Area. What is more, most reluctant Hungary decided 
on building fences on its borders with Serbia and Croatia and recently has con-
ducted referendum concerning on rejecting EU’s plan to settle refugees in the 
country. Orban’s allies state, that such firm and decided standpoint of Hunga-
ry will contribute to other states, also having growing doubts about intensive 
inflows of migrants.54 
International Developments – Most Significant Research Results
Main concerns deriving from migration crisis are associated with econo-
mic and cultural aspects. V4’s population fears mostly of taking over jobs by 
migrants or of poor qualified refugees inflow. Michal Vašečka, working in the 
Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture in Bratislava during a Vise-
grad Group debate on migrations voiced such concerns: “In many Western Eu-
ropean countries, and in all Visegrad countries, there have been entire sectors 
of the economy gradually taken over by particular ethnic groups. This is going 
to be characteristic for our countries as well. We can see it with the Vietnamese 
and the Chinese, but gradually there will be other people arriving from other 
Asian countries.”55
This statement pictures some of the V4 states’ worries. However, even stron-
ger fears seem to be tied with the increase of unemployment rates, especial-
ly within foreign-born population. Such worries are the aftermath of already 
54 A. Lebor, “Quota approval”, Newsweek, 30 September 2016.
55 “Visegrad Group Joint Statement on Migration”, 15 February 2016. http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
calendar/2016/joint-statement-on [accessed 13.01.2017].
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evoked communist rule and worse economic condition of V4 states in compa-
rison to old EU’s member states. For several years we can observe the tendency 
of growing unemployment among foreigners in European countries, especial-
ly among newly arrived migrants. In spite of this fact, most of the empirical 
studies do not show a negative impact of immigration on the labour market. 
According to some research, immigrants increase the labour force and consu-
mer demand, enhancing growth at the same time. What is more, immigrants 
seem to pay more in taxes than they claim in government benefits. They are also 
often taking jobs hard to fill by native-born population, mostly in child care, 
nursery and other occupations not needing high qualifications (Europe should 
see refugees…). Immigrants seem to be the most important for the countries 
with growing old nations and low birthrates.  
What is more, owing to increasing cultural diversity of European societies, 
culturally based worries also grow. They are additionally fueled by frequent ter-
rorist attacks in Euroope and others expressions of violence. In Poland the in-
dicators associated with tolerance are dagerously changing – Poles negatively 
evaluate foreign-born population’s impact on labour market, economy in ge-
neral and perceive migration as a cultural threat. The same proces is happening 
in Hungary, were already 76% of respondents claim that refugees increase li-
kelihood of terrorist attacks and 69% perceive refugees from Syria as a ma-
jor, general threat (PEW Research Centre). Human Rights Watch higlights the 
risks deriving from such radicalisation of European and V4 states’ societies. 
In World Report 2016 it is said: “(…) the uncontrolled and at times chaotic 
refugee flow had sparked deep concern throughout Europe even before ISIS at-
tacked Paris in November, using at least two attackers who may have entered 
Europe with the refugees. That attack intensified the EU’s reaction: new wi-
re-razor fences were erected, border restrictions mushroomed, fear-mongering 
and Islamophobia mounted, and the EU promised Turkey €3 billion in aid 
with the understanding that Turkey would curtail the flow. These steps reflect 
the EU’s longstanding effort to push responsibility for refugees (…)”
All this shows that European Union as a whole and the Visegrad Group as 
a vulnerable area, facing many problems deriving from its historical past and 
geopolitical factors, need to take serious steps aimed at counteracting the chal-
lenges of migration crisis. It seems that main obstacles in finding consistent 
solutions lies in legal, cultural and socio-political aspects. Natural hesitancy 
towards foreign-born, caused by substantially high level of homogeneousness 
of the V4 states’ societies and strong attachement to traditional and religious 
values, is additionaly increased by political and specific rhetoric using emotio-
27
nal narrative. Such processes are visible not only within Visegrad Group but 
in most of European states. This may result in definite change in European 
discourse – V4 may not be the only area afraid of negative results of migration cri-
sis. Great Britain, even before Brexit, did not support the quota proposal. French 
society is reluctant towards new flows of refugees as well. Even most open societies 
of Germany and Sweden are showing growing tendencies of intolerance.
Since change in general worldview of V4 states’ populations would be the har-
dest strategy to reach and fullfil, it would not solve potential threats within secu-
rity and economy fields. However, identification, development and then imple-
mentation of best possible legal solutions and mechanisms of cooperating within 
the field of softening the negative effects of migration crisis may be the answer. 
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